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RECANTATION OF PERJURED TESTIMONY
ANTHONY SALZMAN
Witnesses have violated their judicially adminis-
tered oaths to tell the whole truth since the beginning
of American jurisprudence, and courts and legisla-
tures have engaged in continual efforts to cure the
problem. American perjury laws have traditionally
emphasized deterring witnesses from lying with
threats of severe punishment, a philosophy which led
to the practice of making completed perjury an
unrecantable crime in both federal and state courts.
Perjury provisions in the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 19701 departed from a strict deterrence
philosophy. While this legislation made it easier for
prosecutors to obtain perjury convictions by liberal-
izing proof and evidentiary standards, it provided
that in some circumstances completed perjury may be
recanted, thereby providing an inducement to tell the
truth for witnesses who have already given false
testimony. The new federal rule bears close resem-
blance to the minority rule in state courts which was
advanced by the New York case of People v. Ezaugi.2
Despite this shift at the federal level, a majority of the
states have not as yet adopted similar legislation and
still cling to the stringent "completed crime" rule.'
This article will analyze the development of the
completed crime rule, focusing on the inherent
weaknesses which render the rule an unacceptable
answer to the perjury problem. The operation of
recantation provisions embodied in the minority state
rule and the current federal law will then be explored
and analysis of cases decided under the new federal
rule will reveal a current misunderstanding of the
statute's function. The article will conclude with
the suggestion that federal courts must begin to
apply this effective tool properly, while states ad-
hering to completed crime rules should discard
them and adopt the more workable recantation
provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.
*.J.D., Duke University.
118 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970).
22 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1957).
'See text accompanying notes 12-33 infra.
TESTIMONIAL CORRECTION TENDING TO SHOW
INNOCENCE OF PERJURY: THE WILLFULNESS
REQUIREMENT
The crime of perjury consists of a deliberate
material falsification under oath.4 Accordingly, the
prevailing view in federal and state courts has been
that a witness's correction or his effort to correct
inaccurate testimony is admissible evidence probative
of the conclusion that initial inaccuracies or omis-
sions were indeed not deliberate falsifications. 5
'The federal general perjury statute, and the model
upon which state codes have been drafted, reads as follows:
Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law
of the United States authorizes an oath to be adminis-
tered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify
truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be
true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not
more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. This section is applicable whether the
statement or subscription is made within or without
the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948). All state statutes and the Model
Penal Code follow this federal rule requiring that perjury
be deliberate to be criminally culpable. See American Law
Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962); see, e.g., CONNECTICUT PENAL CODE §
53a-156.
'Most federal and state courts agree that evidence of
recantation of a prior false declaration is relevant to show
that the initial falsehood was not perjurious because it
lacked the essential element of willfulness. It is also agreed
that a witness's non-responsive answer is not perjury if it
results from a mistake, misunderstanding or an inadvertent
omission, that the determination of perjury requires evalua-
tion of a witness's entire testimony and, consequently, that
a witness's correction of his false testimony may be
considered when making the overall evaluation.
The solidarity of judicial acceptance of this principle is
emphasized by noting that courts which follow the com-
pleted crime rule and deny the recantation defense after
perjury has been committed, as well as those courts which
do allow recantation, agree with the willfulness require-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 284
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); United States
273
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The range of proof which is admissible as material
to a witness's lack of intent to testify falsely is ex-
tremely broad. 6 A witness's subjective misunder-
standing will be admissible evidence, " as will his
cultural heritage of lack of mental competence. 'The
promptness with which a witness corrects himself,
his motive for doing so, the kind magnitude of inac-
curacy and the witness's own explanation for the
inaccuracy are also material to show absence of
perjurious intent. Some courts have indicated in
dicta that any evidence competent to explain away
the false testimony will be admissible whenever it
shows reasons disassociated from a willful or corrupt
intention to deceive. ' Consequently, there is gen-
v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.2 (9th Cir. 1971);
Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 623 & n.5 (3d Cir.
1954); Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577, 581-83
(8th Cir. 1935); People v. Baranov, 201 Cal. App. 2d
52, 59-60, 19 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870-71 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962); State v. Fasano, 119 Conn. 455, 461, 177 A. 376,
378 (1935); State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 352, 189
S.W.2d 314, 320 (1945); People v. Brill, 100 Misc. 92,
102, 165 N.Y.S. 65, 71 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917);
Kern v. United States, 169 F. 617, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1909).
Cf. Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 & n.3
(10th Cir. 1951).
The basic dichotomy ofjudicial opinion on recantation is
thus confined to dispute over the effect of a witness's
subsequent correction of a prior intentional false declara-
tion.
6Courts will decide whether prior erroneous testimony
was given deliberately by considering subsequent correc-
tions in the context of the total circumstances of the
witness's testimony. For example, the New York Supreme
Court dismissed an indictment for perjury when the
defendant convinced the court that his original testimony
that he had not signed a certain paper which he had in fact
signed was falsely given because his "attention was not at
first directed to the particular paper" which he was asked to
identify. People v. Brill, 100 Misc. 92,102, 165 N.Y.S. 65,
71 (1917). The court was persuaded by the fact that de-
fendant corrected himself as soon as a photographic copy of
the document was shown him. On the other hand, the New
York Court of Appeals did not give the benefit of the doubt
to a witness who "was no novice on the stand." People v.
Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 444, 141 N.E.2d 580, 583, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75, 78 (1957). In that case, because of the
declarant's experience as a witness, the court interpreted
the correction as no more than a calculated effort to escape
the dire consequences of admitted false swearing, an effort
made only because the state had shown the witness
incontrovertible proof of his perjury.
'See, e.g., Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1956).
8See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir.
1954); Thrasher v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. 95, 237 P. 139
(1925).
9 See, e.g., State v. Fasano, 119 Conn. 455, 177 A. 376
(1935).
eral agreement that a witness may offer his correc-
tion of prior false testimony as probative evidence
that he had never intended to testify falsely. " Al-
though a charge of immateriality will not generally
prevent offered proof from being admitted in evi-
dence, it may influence how that evidence is subse-
quently weighed in reaching a judgment or in decid-
ing what sentence should be imposed. "
"°The Supreme Court of Indiana approved a trial
court's instruction that a witness's correction per se "rebut-
ted the wilful and corrupt intent necessary to constitute
perjury." Henry v. Hamilton, 7 Blackf. 506, 507 (1845). A
California district court held that prejudicial error had been
committed by a lower court in refusing to instruct that
correction of testimony or attempt to correct testimony by a
witness charged with perjury may be valuable to show no
intent to testify falsely. Under California law "correction
during the trial [is] evidence which may be considered of
some value in determining the question of fact on whether
or not the witness did or did not have wilful intent to testify
falsely." People v. Baranov, 201 Cal. App. 2d 52, 60, 19
Cal. Rptr. 866 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). In the extreme case,
evidence of a correction has been so potent that the court
dismissed the perjury indictment. Bijur v. Bendix, 285 F.
974 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
The fact that testimony has been corrected should always
be admissible in evidence to help establish the defendant's
lack of initial intent to swear falsely. The weight given to
this evidence will usually then be left to jury determination.
See, e.g., People v. Baranov, supra. While the issue has not
yet been discussed by any court, it would seem to follow that
the prosecution should also be permitted to introduce the
evidence of the correction to support its case.
"See, e.g., People v. Baranov, 201 Cal. App. 2d 52, 19
Cal. Rptr. 866 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Most courts have
weighed evidence bearing on the intent of witnesses accused
of perjury simply by considering probable intent in the light
of all evidence presented, but some courts have relied almost
exclusively on interpreting the meaning of the alleged
perjurious remark in the linguistic context of defendant's
entire testimony. See People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665,
111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908). Under the contextual analysis the
witness tries to prove absence of intent to deceive by
showing that when the testimony is considered as a whole,
the alleged perjury is modified or elaborated by subsequent
remarks so that the net effect of the entire testimony is to
give a truthful picture of the facts sworn to, thereby
destroying the premise on which the perjury allegation
rests.
The terminology used to describe a lack of mitigating
context may become confusingly intertwined in the standard
of a recantation's timeliness. A correction not made in a
mitigating context may be described as being too late, and
vice versa.
Regardless of which legal argument is adopted-the
analysis which establishes intent directly or the contextual
analysis-the probative factors tend to be the same. To be
admissible, the evidence offered must tend to show lack of
deliberate intent directly or indirectly by proving that the
alleged false testimony was really true, or at least that the
witness believed it to have been true when he testified.
Retaining the artificial distinction between proving in-
[Vol. 67
PERJURED TESTIMONY
THE COMPLETED CRIME RULE: CORRECTION
INEFFECTIVE TO PREVENT PROSECUTION FOR
PERJURY
While courts generally agree that an offer of
testimonial correction is relevant to show that the
inaccurate testimony was not deliberately false and
that no perjury was therefore ever committed, there
is a split of judicial opinion when the witness has
made an intentionally false statement which he later
seeks to correct. Most courts have followed a rule by
which an intentionally false statement constitutes the
completed criminal offense of perjury or of false
swearing, thereby making any subsequent correction
or retraction too late and consequently ineffective to
bar prosecution. 12
The United States Supreme Court stated the rule
and its rationale in United States v. Norris. 13 While
tention by direct or contextual demonstrations will affect
the ease with which the standard of proof required to prove
willfulness can be met. Courts adhering strictly to the
linguistic contextual analysis of a witness's intention to
testify truthfully may find other modes of proof besides
context unacceptable. This could have the dangerous
consequence of making it impossible for a witness accused
of perjury to demonstrate his innocence with extrinsic
evidence of an honest motive if his testimony was simply
very brief or otherwise lacked surrounding verbiage suffi-
cient to support the contextually-oriented showing of honest
intent.
Since a contextual analysis only helps resolve the
threshold question of whether the witness intended his
original answer to be deceitful, and since the actual analysis
any jury uses to reach its conclusion remains the jury's
secret, the fine judicial distinction between admissibility
based on direct proof of intention and indirect proof by
context is unmanageably elusive and of questionable utility.
Since all courts agree that perjury cannot be predicated on
testimony not intended to deceive, the evidentiary weight
given to a witness's subsequent correction should correlate
with the correction's materiality to the witness's actual
veracity or to his intent to be truthful, however that may be
demonstrated.
2 United States v. Talbot, 15 Alas. 590, 602-05, 133 F.
Supp. 120, 126-27 (Dist. Ct. 1955); People v. Baranov,
201 Cal. App. 2d 52, 59-60, 19 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870-71
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962); State v. Fasano, 119 Conn. 455,
461, 177 A. 376, 378 (1935); State v. Phillips, 175 Kan. 50,
53-54, 259 P.2d. 185, 188 (1953); Martin v. Miller, 4
Mo. 47, 48-49, 28 Am. Dec. 342, 344 (1835); In re
Caruba, 139 N.J. Eq. 404, 51 A.2d 446, 450-51 (Ch.
1947); Butler v. State, 429 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968); cf People v. Markan, 123 Misc. 689,
692-93, 206 N.Y.S. 197, 199-200 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1924). But see State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 352,
189 S.W.2d 314, 320 (1945). See federal cases cited in notes
21 and 22 infra.
13300 U.S. 564 (1937). The case came to the Supreme
Court after the Eighth Circuit had acquitted the defendant
because he had made a valid recantation. Norris v. United
States, 86 F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir. 1936). The Eighth
testifying before a Senate subcommittee, the defen-
dant reported that he had not received certain money
or support for his senatorial campaign. On the
following day another witness testified that defendant
had been given money, whereupon defendant
returned to the stand on his own request to admit
having received the money in question. The Supreme
Court held that the correction could not alter the fact
that intentionally false testimony had already been
given and that perjury was therefore irrevocably
established:
Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes
the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a
witness's statement has once been made. . . . [Tihe
oath administered to the witness calls on him freely to
disclose the truth in the first instance and not to put the
court and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance,
and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross
examination, by extraneous investigation or other
collateral means. 14
The threshold question in jurisdictions following
this completed crime rule is whether the testimony
which defendant seeks to correct was willfully false.
If the falsehood was willful, no subsequent correction
will be admissible. Once criminal intent has been
conceded, neither the promptness of a correction,"
the witness's motive for making it, 16 nor the extent of
Circuit found that a proper charge would have instructed
that the respondent was not guilty if he corrected his prior
incorrect or even intentionally false statements while the
hearing was continuing and the matter still pending before
the Senate subcommittee. The Eighth Circuit's exemplary
charge stated the law on recantation as it had been decided
under the "New York rule." See notes 48-50 infra and
accompanying text. By reversing the Eighth Circuit, and
ruling that there is no locus poenitentiae for perjury, the
Supreme Court clearly rejected the New York rule permit-
ting recantation after a deliberate falsehood.
14300 U.S. at 574. Although the Court held that proven
guilt could never be expunged by a subsequent repentance,
it was careful to add in dictum that correction would cer-
tainly be admissible to show lack of initial intent. Id. at 576.
"
1 See Llanos-Senarillos v. United States, 177 F.2d 164
(9th Cir. 1949). The Ninth Circuit stated that the prompt-
ness of a correction is of no importance when it has already
been established that the defendant had willfully testified
falsely. The court distinguished the circumstance where the
false statement is withdrawn of the witness's own volition
and without delay so that the statement and its withdrawal
may be found to constitute "one inseparable incident out
of which an intention to deceive cannot rightly be drawn."
Id. at 165.
"
6 See Kern v. United States, 169 F. 617 (6th Cir. 1909).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a perjury conviction based on
willful false statements which the defendant had corrected
before the truth became known to others. The court rejected
the contention that a perjury conviction should not lie,
19761
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injury to judicial administration caused by his
falsehood 7 is admissible to mitigate guilt. Conse-
quently, if a witness has admitted having deliberately
perjured himself, the only benefit he can hope to
obtain from correcting his testimony is a reduction in
sentence. 18
Before the recantation rule was codified by the
Federal False Declaration statute in 1970,19 the
completed crime rule had been universally endorsed
by federal courts. 20 The Third, Sixth, Eight and
Tenth Circuits expressly followed the rule, 2 and the
Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits recognized the rule
by implication. " Federal courts have found perjury
irrevocably culpable when committed before a federal
grand jury, 23 a state grand jury, 2 a United States
District Court, 2 a bankruptcy hearing, 2' and a
Senate subcommittee hearing. 2' The purpose of the
completed crime rule is to ensure that the deterrent
value of perjury sanctions is not eroded by providing
stating the general principle that "[t]he offenses of false
swearing and concealment when once committed could not
be retrieved by right and lawful conduct and the doing of
things 'meet for repentance,' however they might affect the
judgment of the court in imposing sentence." Id. at 620.
"See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
"
8 See, e.g., United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196,
1198 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1971); Kern v. United States, 169 F.
617, 620 (6th Cir. 1909).
'918 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1970).
"Prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1970)
only the circuits mentioned in the text had decided cases
involving the correction issue.
21 Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir.
1951); United States v. Margolis, 138 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir.
1943); Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir.
1935); Kern v. United States, 169 F. 617 (6th Cir. 1909).
"Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1956); Llanos-Senarillos v. United States, 177 F.2d 164
(9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Hirsch, 136 F.2d 976 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 759 (1943).
Despite passage of the False Declaration Statute, the
Second and Ninth Circuits still appear to embrace the
completed crime rule. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); United States
v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1972). See notes 87-95
infra and accompanying text for discussion of the judicial
misapplication of the recantation provision in the False
Declaration Statute.
"United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.2
(9th Cir. 1971).
2United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973).
2'Id. at 284. This holding was unusual in that the Sec-
ond Circuit did not follow the New York rule stated in
People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957). (See note 31 infra and accompanying
text.) The Second Circuit reversed its position in United
States v. Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1975).
2'Kern v. United States, 160 F. 617 (6th Cir. 1909).
27Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir.
1935).
witnesses with the correction device as a means to
escape punishment.'28
Since the crime of perjury requires that the witness
have willfully attempted to mislead, the completed
crime rule must necessarily yield to an accused
perjurer's showing that his false testimony was not
given with the requisite intent.29 Consequently, this
rule does not completely eliminate the availability of
testimonial correction as a defense to perjury; it
merely complicates the witness's showing of proof,
demanding first that he correct himself and second
that he convince the court that the initial testimony
was not deliberately false.
Because the prosecutor still bears the burden of
establishing willfulness, whether the completed
crime rule actually reduces the availability of the
correction defense will ultimately be determined by
the scope of the evidence admissible by either side to
establish the presence or absence of intent. As
pointed out above," this standard is extremely
variable, but the tendency is for courts to admit
evidence of almost any type that might have rele-
vance to the intent issue. For example, when a
witness corrected himself because his perjury had
been discovered, his motive for making the correction
was held to bear on the willfulness with which he
originally testified." In the extreme case, when a
witness corrected himself when he ought reasona-
ably to have known that his original perjury had
been discovered, his motive for making the correction
the correction was found sufficiently tainted by an
inferred desire to escape punishment to justify an
underlying inference that the initial falsehood was
willful. 2
The theoretical result of the completed crime rule
is to limit the availability of correction in direct
relation to the leniency of the standard by which
prosecutors are permitted to establish the willfulness
of the initial false statement. Since proof of willful
false testimony irrevocably forecloses the correction
defense under this rule, when willfulness can be
established easily, correction will be foreclosed more
frequently. Many courts have substantially reduced
the standard of proof by which the prosecutor must
establish willfulness, "3 and it may be asked whether
28E.g., United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574
(1933).
"See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
"Cf. United States v.- Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937);
People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957).
2Cf. People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580,
161 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957).
"See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
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the reduction does not often reach a point where the
presumption of the defendant's innocence becomes an
empty phrase.34
Theoretically, the completed crime rule provides
the strongest deterrent scheme to prevent initial
perjury. On the other hand, by limiting the availabil-
ity of recantation, the completed crime rule has the
unfortunate additional consequence of reducing the
number of corrections of completed falsehoods which
witnesses make. 5 One can only hope that the
corrections which are discouraged because of the
completed crime rule are predominantly ones which
would have necessitated "extraction" by a prosecutor
already in possession of the true answer, rather than
voluntary ones made before anyone but the witness
had learned the truth. In view of the questionable
efficacy of the pure deterrent scheme, the issue raised
is whether the possible decrease in initial deterrence
value of perjury sanctions caused by permitting
recantation is not outweighed by the benefits of
obtaining more corrections of completed falsehoods.
CORRECTION As RECANTATION WHICH CAN
EXPUNGE GUILT OF PRIOR PERJURY
Where a defendant willfully testifies falsely but
subsequently corrects his former statements, it has
sometimes been held, in contrast to the completed
crime rule, that the perjury has not been committed
or that it has been committed but prosecution cannot
be predicated thereon.36 Before the perjury provi-
sions of the Organized Crime Control Act31 were
"There are two issues here; (1) Is preventing tes-
timonial correction, except under pain of perjury prosecu-
tion, an effective way to obtain more truthful testimony
than we now receive? That is, will this kind of deterrence
really have any impact on a person who intentionally testi-
ties falsely on the stand; for example, a witness who is
afraid for his life? Isn't it preferable to give him a way out
in case he changes his mind, becomes willing to risk telling
the truth and accepts police protection? (2) Even if this
deterrence technique is effective, can we allow it to be ad-
ministered in such a way that the defendant is shorn of his
right of presumed innocence because the willfulness ele-
ment of the crime has been made so easy to satisfy?
"
5See United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1972).3 See generally, Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 662-63,
114 So. 429,431 (1927); Henry v. Hamilton, 7 Blackf. 506,
509 (Ind. 1845); State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 352, 189
S.W.2d 314, 320 (1945); People v. Gillette, 126 App.
Div. 665, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908); Commonwealth v.
Irvine, 14 Pa. D. & C. 275 (1930). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Giles, 353 Mass. 1, 13-14 & n.10, 228 N.E.2d 70, 78-79
& n.10 (1967); State v. Ledford, 195 Wash. 581, 585, 81
P.2d 830, 831-32 (1938). But see Martin v. Miller, 4 Mo.
47, 48-49, 28 Am. Dec. 342, 344 (1835).
3718 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970).
enacted in 1970, no federal court had permitted
recantation of deliberate false testimony. Conse-
quently, judicial guidelines for applicability of the
recantation rule have been generated by state
courts.3 8 When considered together, these diverse
holdings develop the recantation principle into an
ad hoc rule which forgives perjury after it has been
properly corrected so that prosecution for the initial
false testimony will be barred.
The specific test for determining a proper correc-
tion-one which will be acceptable as a recantation
-still varies among jurisdictions, but courts have
usually insisted that the correction be made before
the same examining body to which the false testi-
mony was originally given.39 Local requirements
differ on whether the correction is permissible as a
recantation if the falsehood has already misled the
investigation, 40 on how soon a correction must be
made, 41 and on whether the correction must be
motivated by an honest and voluntary effort to
recant.42 Jurisdictional variations of the rule can be
analyzed as different combinations of one or more of
these factors of prejudice, timeliness, and motive,
including specificity as to the relative weight each
should be given.
The Timeliness Standard
In People v. Ezaugi, 43 the New York Court of
38For this reason the completed crime rule has often
been referred to as the "federal rule on recantation." See,
e.g., 60 Am. JUR. 2d Perjury § 47 (1966). This terminology
has been abandoned in this article in favor of a simpler
nomenclature by which "recantation" is used to describe a
correction which potentially can exonerate the witness from
guilt for his initial perjury. "Retraction" refers to with-
drawal of the perjurious remark by correcting it, but it does
not imply that guilt for the crime once completed can be
forgiven.
39See, e.g., People v. Brill, 100 Misc. 92, 102, 165
N.Y.S. 65, 71 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917).
'"See, e.g., People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d
580, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957).
4 Compare People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111
N.Y.S. 133 (1908), with People v. Ashby, 9 App. Div. 2d
464, 195 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 8
N.Y.2d 238, 168 N.E.2d 672, 203 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1960).2 Compare Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429
(1927), with Commonwealth v. Irvine, 14 Pa. D. & C. 275
(1930).
32 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1957). Two days after his original appearance before a
grand jury the defendant in Ezaugi reappeared before the
same grand jury to admit that the testimony he had
previously given was deliberately false. The court found
that defendant's second appearance was prompted by his
realization that his initial false testimony had not succeeded
in deceiving the district attorney. The court said the
correction was made only because the defendant believed
1976]
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Appeals' 4 endorsed a recantation rule while prescrib-
ing rigid guidelines with respect to the fundamental
factors of timeliness, motive and prejudice. The court
held that the recantation defense to perjury is
applicable to
knowingly false testimony only if and when it is done
promptly before the body conducting the inquiry has
been deceived or misled to the harm and prejudice of
its investigation, and when no reasonable likelihood
exists that the witness has learned that his perjury is
known or may become known to the authorities.4
5
Exactly what was meant by "promptly" is not clear.
One reading of the court's language suggests that
that the prosecutor had "incontrovertible proof of his
perjury," 2 N.Y.2d at 444, 141 N.E.2d at 583, 161 N.Y.S.
2d at 78, and that the correction was not therefore a
demonstration of penitence, but a calculated effort to escape
the consequences of his crime. The court also found that
defendant's false testimony had frustrated the grand jury's
investigation. The defendant's correction flatly failed the
three-part test-promptness, motive, and harm to the inves-
tigation-and his conviction for perjury was affirmed.
14 The New York Court of Appeal's position on recanta-
tion is particularly significant in the evolution of the
recantation rule, for when the United States Supreme Court
originally rejected the recantation rule, it paid attention to
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals had not yet
spoken:
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York has definitely held with the respondent
upon the point, in a case where the witness corrected
his false testimony immediately and told the truth
although, in that case, the conviction was reversed on
several grounds any one of which would have been
adequate for reversal. The Court of Appeals of New
York has not spoken on the subject, and in a later case
a lower court has refused to follow the decision
mentioned where the contradictory statement was not
part of the same examination at which the false
statement was made.
United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1937)
[footnotes omitted]. The arguments which the New York
Court of Appeals advanced in Ezaugi responded directly to
the issues which troubled the Supreme Court when it
rejected the recantation rule in Norris.
4*2 N.Y.2d at 443, 141 N.E.2d at 583, 161 N.Y.S.2d at
78. It has been suggested that the recantation rule
announced in Ezaugi is so strict that in most cases courts
following that rule will achieve the same result as a
decision under the completed crime rule. See Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 276 (1959). A particular correction might fail to
protect a witness from perjury prosecution on the one hand
because it failed the rigid test set out in Ezaugi or on the
other because of the dogmatic prohibition against forgiving
the completed crime. The crucial difference between the
application of the two rules, however, lies in the flexibility
offered by the recantation rule which the completed crime
rule cannot match. Thus, under the completed crime rule
there is absolutely no circumstance in which a defendant
can correct his willfully false testimony without inviting
when the motive for correction is proper, and the
investigation has not been frustrated, the chronologi-
cal timeliness of a correction is only minimally
important. The Ezaugi court seemed to imply that
chronological immediacy is not the central inquiry
but only an indicator of the extent to which the
investigation has been prejudiced. The court, how-
ever, did not actually state this conclusion. To this
extent the holding remains ambiguous, leaving
unsettled whether "promptly" refers to a time period
of vague duration or whether it merely characterizes
any correction which may have been made before
harm has been caused.
The New York Supreme Court had already
wrestled with the timeliness issue in People v.
Gillette,'46 which held that recantation should be
allowed when the defendant's perjury has caused no
harm because he told the truth immediately follow-
ing his perjured testimony. Like the Ezaugi opinion,
the court's language suggests that the competence of
a subsequent correction to bar prosecution for initial
perjury should be determined by inquiring primarily
into the extent of prejudice which the false statement
has caused the investigation, and that prejudice may
be determined by the correction's promptness. Again,
however, the language is unclear and does not settle
whether the timeliness factor is an independent
inquiry or a secondary index of the extent of harm or
prejudice which the delay has caused. The policy
upon which the court based its decision is persuasive
of the latter view:
A judicial investigation or trial has for its sole object
the ascertainment of the truth that justice may be done.
It holds out every inducement to a witness to tell the
truth by inflicting severe penalties upon those who do
not. This inducement would be destroyed if a witness
could not correct a false statement except by running
the risk of being indicted and convicted for perjury."
In view of the Gillette court's stated policies, the
immediacy with which testimony must be corrected
prosecution by so doing. The perjury sanctions act as an
irrevocable threat which once made can never be with-
drawn. If they fail to encourage truthful testimony in the
first instance, they will surely discourage it in the second.
The recantation rule offers a similar degree of deterrent
protection when its guidelines are strictly construed, but it
also includes the option of removing the threat of penalty if
the initial deterrence has not succeeded. Thus, while the
two rules may achieve the same result in many cases, only
the recantation rule is sufficiently adaptable to insure that
perjury sanctions do not become counterproductive.
46126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908).
4
71d. at 673-74, 111 N.Y.S. at 139.
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in order for the perjury to be excused should be
construed to require measurement not by an inflexi-
ble rule which perfunctorily rejects any correction
made after an arbitrarily determined period of time.
Instead, immediacy should be determined primarily
by the measure of inconvenience or prejudice which
the witness's false testimony has caused. This
evaluation would be a determination of fact based
on the particular circumstances of each case.
In United States v. Norris4 s the United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and inter-
preted "immediately," as used in the Gillette opin-
ion, to be an extremely strict construction of the
timeliness test, requiring chronological promptness
as a prerequisite to admitting a correction as re-
cantation competent to bar prosecution.4 The
Supreme Court did not interpret "immediacy" as
a flexible measure of prejudice or harm to judicial
administration. Rather, the Court decided that
"immediacy" was historically a measure of literal
timeliness, and then reached its own holding that
any delay, however slight, between a false testi-
mony and its correction is too long to be "immedi-
ate" because the crime of perjury is complete as
soon as the false statement is made. 50
Most jurisdictions have followed the Supreme
Court and construed timeliness as an independent
third prong of the recantation test. However, there
are a variety of time periods which have been
established as the cut-off point for determining the
untimeliness of a correction, and frequently these
variations have been more lenient than the Norris
standard. Corrections have been permitted as recan-
tations when made "before the submission of the
case," 51 two days after the initial testimony, 52 and in
one case a correction made as long as nineteen days
after the initial perjury was not automatically ex-
cluded simply because it was late. " However, the
problem remains that a late correction which has not
48300 U.S. 564 (1937). See notes 13-14 supra and
accompanying text for further discussion of the case.
4'Id. at 575-76.
5 Id. at 573-74. The Supreme Court's decision to
construe timeliness as an independent inquiry rather than
one merely probative of prejudice to the investigation or bad
motive on the part of the witness offering to correct is the
crux of the analysis setting out the completed crime rule.
See notes 12-35 supra and accompanying text.
" People v. Brill, 100 Misc. 92, 102, 165 N.Y.S. 65, 71
(N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917).
" People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957).
"
3People v. Ashby, 9 App. Div. 2d 464, 467-68, 195
N.Y.S.2d 301, 305 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 8
N.Y.2d 238, 168 N.E.2d 672, 203 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1960).
yet harmed the investigation and which was not
improperly motivated may be obligatorily refused as
a recantation simply because it is offered later than a
particular jurisdiction's rule permits. This would
reduce the likelihood of such corrections ever being
made and would appear not to be offset by any
beneficial judicial purpose. 54
The jurisdictional variations of the timeliness test
can be analyzed as a two-phased dispute. The issue
at the first phase is whether timeliness is to be a
fixed, independent standard or whether it is to be
considered according to the likelihood that the inves-
tigation was prejudiced or as evidence of a correction
improperly motivated. If the first alternative is fol-
lowed, the issue at the second phase of analysis is
how long a delay will still be found timely. Under the
second alternative, chronological timeliness has di-
minished importance and inquiry focuses directly on
whether the two fundamental tests of prejudice and
motive have been satisfied.
The second alternative, considering the timeliness
of corrections to be merely probative of a primary
concern that judicial resources not be prejudiced,
seems preferable to the inflexibity of a literal time-
liness rule. If the timeliness test is construed in
terms of prejudice, the same analysis may also in-
dicate the likelihood that a correction was improp-
erly motivated. Thus, a great delay between false
statement and correction would create a presump-
tion that the witness's motive for correcting was
improper or that his falsehood had prejudiced the
proceeding too much for recantation to be permiss-
ible. The witness offering the correction would
then bear the burden of rebutting the presumption
which his delay had established.
The Motivation and Prejudice Standards
While analysis of the disparate administration of
the timeliness test leads to considerable complexity,
varied approaches to motive for the correction and to
prejudice caused to the investigation do not. These
factors are not indicators of an independent criterion
but rather are the final criteria by which the
admissibility of a recantation is determined. They
function as safeguards arising from a policy of
concern that judicial administration not suffer
because of its own effort to induce truthfulness
through allowance of recantation. Jurisdictional var-
5s Extreme cases, such as a correction offered subsequent
to the completion of a trial, surely cannot be permitted.
Thus, even under the most liberal view of "immediately,"
there must be some point after which a correction will
always be too late.
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iations indicate the extent to which local policy will
tolerate sacrificing either the morally scrupulous
requirement that witnesses tell the truth in the first
instance or judicial efficiency in the effort to obtain
truth.
A Pennsylvania court first considered the motive
issue in Commonwealth v. Irvine. 55 At a previous
trial the defendant had testified that bandits had
robbed him of certain jewelry about which he was
being questioned, but later he admitted that his story
of the holdup was untrue and that he had pawned the
jewelry in question. The fact that defendant's admis-
sion was forced from him "by the manifest impossi-
bility of successful persistence in an incredible tale"
did not prevent defendant's acquittal of the charge of
perjury, the court taking the extreme view that the
recantation rule was "not concerned with the wit-
ness's reason for changing his testimony." 56 Simi-
larly, in Brannen v. State, 57 the Supreme Court of
Florida allowed a recantation without inquiring into
the witness's motive for correcting his prior false-
hood. "
The questions of whether a witness's motive in
correcting his false testimony is unacceptably im-
proper and whether judicial administration has
been prejudiced by a falsehood to such an extent
that recantation should not be allowed are ques-
tions of specific fact which presiding judges should
answer in their discretion. The presiding judge is
in the best position to balance the interest of truth
ascertainment against the harm to the judicial
proceeding which he is administering. Similarly,
the presiding judge is best able to gauge whether
a witness who offers to correct his prior testimony
is tainted by motive to escape punishment for his
wrong, or whether he is honestly repentant and
unlikely to lie in the future. Additionally, in the
case of a correction offered under tainted motive,
the judge should be given the option of permitting
the witness to escape punishment in exchange for
testimony which may benefit the overall judicial
process more than the failure to punish a dishonest
but repentant witness will harm it. 5
5114 Pa. D. & C. 275 (1930).
61d. at 276.
"94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429 (1927).
"I1d. at 662-63, 114 So. at 431. But see People v.
Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1957) (inquiry into the recanting witness's motive is vital
when determining whether to accept his recantation).
5 United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir.
1975), provides a good example of the breadth of a judge's
freedom to determine whether a witness's recantation is
permissible. In that case the prosecution showed to a
While some state and federal courts have frus-
trated the development of a workable recantation
rule through misplaced emphasis on chronological
timeliness, the "New York rule" advanced in
Ezaugi recognized the proper interweaving of the
factors of timeliness, motive, and prejudice as a
better solution to the perjury problem. The Ezaugi
test requires that the presiding judge inquire ini-
tially into the "timeliness" of a correction; how-
ever, the question of timeliness turns on whether the
testimony sought to be corrected has already prejud-
iced the administration of justice and on whether the
witness believed he was providing information with
his correction which the authorities did not already
have. 6o By varying the intensity of this scrutiny, a
deciding court can encourage corrections whenever it
deems correction helpful without making the privi-
lege available to every potential perjurer.
THE FEDERAL RECANTATION STATUTE:
RECANTATION BEFORE FEDERAL COURT OR
GRAND JURY
The federal codification of the correction rule
permitting recantation is set out in 18 U.S.C. §
1623(d) (1970), a provision in the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (OCCA):
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury
proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person
making the declaration admits such declaration to be
false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this
section if, at the time the admission is made, the
declaration has not substantially affected the proceed-
ing, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has
been or will be exposed. 6"
This subsection, which is quite similar to the
Ezaugi test, 62 provides that an admission which
complies with its specifications for timeliness and
motivation is a recantation that will purge a witness
of liability for having made a knowingly false ma-
terial declaration.
To be properly understood, the federal recantation
provision should be considered in the context of the
witness suspected of perjury a box of tape recordings which
allegedly contradicted his testimony. The court indicated in
dictum that a recantation made after seeing the tapes would
be permissible and would pass the motive test set out in the
federal recantation statute. Id. at 666.
"The rigidity of the Ezaugi standard for permissible
recantation is emphasized by the deciding court's use of
restrictive conjunctive language in setting out the elements
of its test. See note 70 infra.
6118 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1970).
"
2See note 74 infra.
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complementary provisions set out in subsections
1623(a), (b), (c) and (e) which together form Title IV
of OCCA. OCCA was enacted to eradicate organized
crime in the United States "by strengthening the
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by provid-
ing enhanced sanctions" to deal with unlawful
organized crime activities, 63 The Act is the latest step
in a long effort to unify perjury statutes6' and to
tighten "loopholes" through which leaders of orga-
nized crime have frequently been able to escape con-
victions. 65 Title IV, section 401 of OCCA amended
the general perjury statutes 66 by adding section 1623
expressly to discourage perjury in federal grand jury
and court proceedings. 67 The new section facilitates
61S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1stSess. [hereinafter
cited as S. REP.] 2 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.] 2 (1970).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948). Reviser's Note: based on 18
U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 231. March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 125, 35
Stat. 1111 [derived from R.S. § 5392]. The Supreme
Court discussed the statute's scope:
This Statute takes the place of the similar provision
of § 5392 of the Revised Statutes, which in turn was a
substitute for a number of statutes in regard to perjury
and was phrased so as to embrace all cases of false
swearing whether in a court of justice or before
administrative officers acting within their powers (see
Revisers' Report, Vol. 2, pp. 2582, 2583).
United States v. Smull, 236 U.S. 405, 408 (1915), [prior
history not recorded] [footnote omitted].
O5H.R. 10788, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This bill
was sponsored by Hon. Mario Biaggi, Representative in
Congress from the State of New York and was incorpo-
rated in S. 30, the Senate Bill which was enacted as section
1623. Mr. Biaggi stated the purpose of the forerunner
bill:
The purpose of the organized crime bill, H.R.
10788, is to fight the stranglehold organized crime has
on our society by closing prosecution loopholes in our
laws, which make it difficult, if not impossible, to
prosecute major figures of organized crime and keep
them in jail when they are convicted.
Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at
144 (1970).
618 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622 (1948).67The SenateJudiciary Committee indicates that section
1623 is a special amendment to section 1621. The commit-
tee said: "The proposal is intended to supplement, not
supplant, the existing statutes dealing with perjury and
subornation of perjury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622...." S.
REP. 109.
On the other hand, the Judiciary Committee hasjustified
the distinction between the statutes by emphasizing the
need to make perjury convictions easier to obtain in federal
grand jury and court. S. ReP. 110.
These statements of purpose leave unresolved the ques-
tion of whether a government attorney has discretion to
prosecute perjury committed in those proceedings under
whichever statute he chooses. See notes 68 and 79 infra.
federal perjury prosecutions by loosening the proof
and evidentiary standards necessary to sustain a
conviction, and it also increases the penalties for
perjury. Subsection 1623(a) relaxes the "willfulness"
standard specified in the general perjury statute to
include "knowingly" as well as "willfully" false
material declarations within the new title, and it
provides greater penalties than the general perjury
statute provides .66 Section 1623(c) provides specifi-
cally for the prosecution of a false declaration in the
case of irreconcilable contradictory statements, with-
out the necessity of specifying which of the declara-
tions is false. 69 Sections 1623(a) and (e) abolish the
6818 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1970) reads as follows:
Whoever under oath in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States knowingly makes any false material declaration
or makes or uses any other information, including any
book, paper, document, record, recording, or other
material, knowing the same to contain any false
material declaration, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
The general perjury statutes (18 U.S.C. § § 1621, 1622)
provide for a fine of not more than $2,000 or imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both. The co-existence of the
general perjury statutes and section 1623, which only
applies to false declarations in federal court or grand jury,
may have undesirable consequences in cases of violations
occurring in those proceedings. The legislative history of the
statutes is inconclusive on the extent to which section 1623
supplants section 1621, if it does so at all. See note 14
supra.
If section 1623, the narrower statute, does not control,
friction between the statutes will develop in cases in which
both apply, because the statutes permit different maximum
penalties and because section 1623(d) allows the defense of
recantation which section 1621 does not recognize.
Thus, the disturbing possibility exists that the govern-
ment may be able to elect to prosecute under whichever
statute it chooses in cases involving perjury in federal court
or grand jury. This would give the prosecutor the power to
manipulate the maximum penalty and the standard of proof
required to convict and to render useless a recantation
defense simply by bringing charges under one statute or the
other. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 282-83 &
n.8 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'g 340 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See note 73 infra;
6918 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1970). The statute reads:
An indictment or information for violation of this
section alleging that, in any proceedings before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made
two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to
the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need
not specify which declaration is false if-
(1) each declaration was material to the point in
question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period




"two-witness rule" not only where there are two or
more inconsistent statements made under oath,70 but
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of
a declaration set forth in the indictment or informa-
tion shall be established sufficient for conviction by
proof that the defendant while under oath made
irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to
the point in question in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a
defense to an indictment or information made pursu-
ant to the first sentence of this subsection that the
defendant at the time he made each declaration
believed the declaration was true.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1970) reads as follows:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is
sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that
such proof be made by any particular number of wit-
nesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.
The "two-witness" rule evolved from the fundamental
rule of ecclesiastical law (before 300 A.D.) that testimony of
a single witness was in no case sufficient proof to justify a
legal verdict. By the early 170 0's English common law had
substantially rejected this system of counting witnesses in
favor of the principle that credibility does not depend on
numbers of witnesses but rather on the quality of their
testimony. Accordingly, the common law adopted the
general rule that the testimony of a single witness may
suffice in any case as evidence upon which ajury may found
a verdict. The single common law exception to that
doctrine, denominated the "two-witness rule," was that one
witness, without corroborating circumstances, did not suf-
fice on a charge of perjury. Since the accused could not tes-
tify in criminal proceedings, the oath of one witness would
normally have positive value. In perjury, however, the ac-
cused's own oath was at issue, and in evidence, and if only
one other witness testified there would be merely "oath
against oath," which was not deemed sufficient to establish
a legal proof.
The direct evidence rule simply specified that, although
the corroboration could be of any nature, it had to be
evidence designed to increase the witness's credibility by
confirming his testimony without necessitating inference or
presumption. This rule has usually been applied to permit
documentary corroboration of a witness's testimony. The
direct evidence rule, like the two-witness rule, is a quantita-
tive rule of evidence in the sense that it permits corroborat-
ing evidence to "replace" a second witness. W. BEST, THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE WITH ELEMENTARY
RULES FOR CONDUCTING THE EXAMINATION AND CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES §§ 596-606 (American ed.
Chamberlayne 1883); 7 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2040-43 (3d ed. 1940).
The favored rationale for retaining the quantitative evi-
dence rules in modern times is that they protect wit-
nesses from unwarranted attacks in the guise of perjury
prosecutions which might otherwise deter citizens from
voluntarily and honestly participating as witnesses in
the judicial system. The contrary argument recognizes that
the system cannot operate without witnesses, but it adds
that the same evidence rules which may protect honest
witnesses make it difficult to prosecute dishonest ones.
When the first drafts of the Model Penal Code were
also where only one of the allegedly inconsistent
statements is made under oath.71 Contrary to previ-
ous practice, 2 section 1623(e) provides that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient for conviction
and no special kind of proof is required.
7 3
By increasing the likelihood of conviction for
perjury in federal court and grand jury proceedings,
as well as the consequent penalties, subsections
1623(a), (b), (c) and (e) are intended to deter wit-
nesses from initial false testimony. Subsection
1623(d) was intended to provide an attractive escape
from the harsh penalties of the accompanying sub-
sections by providing "an inducement to the witness
to give truthful testimony by permitting him volun-
tarily to correct a false statement without incurring
the risk [sic] prosecution by doing so." 7
being written, there was considerable debate on whether
quantitative evidence rules should be continued, or whether
the requirement should be simply that proof must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare, e.g.,
Orfield, Proof of Perjury and the "Two Witnesses" Re-
quirement in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 Sw. L.J. 227
(1963) with Comment, Proof of Perjury: The Two Witness
Requirement, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 86 (1961). The final draft
of the Model Penal Code, however, retained the two-wit-
ness corroborative evidence rule. MODEL PENAL CODE §
241.1 (6) (Proposal Official Draft 1962). Judicial
opinion has also retained the "two-witness" evidence
requirement in prosecutions brought under the general
perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948). Weiler v. United
States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945), rev'g 143 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1944) decided under 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1909), on which
section 1621 was based; United States v. Goldberg, 290
F.2d 727 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961). The
treatises are in accord. 7 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2042 (3d ed. 1940).
Thus, the specification that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt will sustain a conviction for false declaration in
federal court or grand jury is a major departure from
historical precedent.
" United States v. Hamilton, 348 F. Supp. 749, 750
(W.D. Pa. 1972).
"
2See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945);
Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926) (compari-
son with previous standard of proof).
"
5Section 1623(e) makes proof beyond a reasonable
doubt under this section sufficient for conviction. It is
specified that proof need not be made by any particu-
lar number of witnesses or by documentary or other
particular type of evidence. This provision permits
proof of the false declaration offense to be made by the
same beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for
conviction in prosecutions for all other criminal
offenses.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM.'NEws 404 (1970).
See note 68 supra for discussion of the possible conse-
quences of applying the "reasonable doubt" standard of
proof to the crime of perjury.74H. R. REP. at 48. The inducement which section
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The provisions of section 1623 function as two
complementary parts-the deterrence subsections
and the inducement inherent in the recantation
subsection-which together make the statute a
potent truth-gathering tool added to the judicial
armory to aid the fight against organized crime.7'
This "carrot and stick" analysis makes sense out of
the statute's otherwise inconsistent legislative his-
tory. When Congress enacted section 1623(d)'s
recantation provision, the Senate cited as authority
1623(d) offers is greater than that offered in either case law
or state statutory predecessors. The federal statute enhances
the inducement effect of the recantation provision by
making the privilege available in a greater variety of
situations. The same language which increases the potential
applicability of the privilege has the collateral consequence
of increasing the trial court's influence in determining
whether the privilege will be available in particular cases.
This broad statutory construction is exemplified by
comparing the text of section 1623(d) with the recantation
rule as it had evolved under case law in People v. Ezaugi
(see notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text) and with
the subsequent New York codification of that rule, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1975).
The court's opinion in Ezaugi, like the text of § 210.25,
phrases the retraction requirements in the conjunctive. For
a recantation to be sufficiently timely to be permissible it
must be made before the examination has been misled and
before there is reasonable likelihood that the witness has
learned that his perjury no longer deceives. In contrast, 18
U.S.C. § 1623(d) substitutes the disjunctive "or," thereby
greatly increasing the situations in which the recantation
bar to perjury prosecution becomes available to witnesses.
For instance, under section 1623(d) one who admits a prior
false declaration in the same continuous proceeding may
escape prosecution for perjury even if the investigation has
been substantially hindered by the false declaration so long
as it has not become obvious that the falsity has been or will
be exposed.
"See United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.),
rev'd on reargument, 506 F.2d 319 (1974), for a discussion
of the complementary function of the statute's separate
parts. In Lardieri, the Third Circuit discussed a possible
extreme ramification of the complementary theory, sug-
gesting that an affirmative duty to inform witnesses of the
recantation provision may attach whenever a prosecutor
highlights the perjury penalty provisions. The court was
motivated by concern for the adverse effect on the evi-
dence-gathering system that a prosecutor's intimidating
threats to witnesses could have:
The seminal modern treatment of the history of the
offense concludes that one consideration of policy
overshadowed all others during the years when
perjury first emerged as a common law offense: "That
the measures taken against the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or
testifying." Study of Perjury, reprinted in Report of
New York Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc.
No. 60, at 249 (1935).
497 F.2d at 321, quoting Bronston v. United States, 409
U.S. 352, 359 (1973).
the leading case for the completed crime rule,"
emphasizing that initial perjury must be deterred."
"The Senate Judiciary Committee understood 18
U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1970) to be based on N.Y. PENAL LAW §
210.25 (McKinney 1975), which reads:
In any prosecution for perjury, it is an affirmative
defense that the defendant retracted his false statement
in the course of the proceeding in which it was made
before such false statement substantially affected the
proceeding and before it became manifest that its fals-
ity was or would be exposed.
The statute, the Committee indicated, embodied the rule
on retraction promulgated in United States v. Norris. The
Committee reported: "This provision codifies dictum in
present case law under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. See United States
v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 573, 574 (1937)." S. REP. 150.
The Senate Committee's cite to Norris, however, is not
consistent with its reference to the New York Penal Law,
because Norris holds that completed perjury will always
sustain a conviction. Furthermore, this cite expressly rejects
the statement in the Practice Commentary accompanying
N.Y. Penal Law § 210.25 which indicates that the statute
codifies the case-law rule on "recantation" established in
People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957). The Commentary also interpreted the
Ezaugi case, and concluded that it set out a more liberal
rule than Norris did. Furthermore, by replacing the Ezaugi
requirement that a recantation be "done promptly" with
the provision that it be made "in the course of the
proceeding," the commentator said, "§ 210.25 recognizes
that the purposes of justice are equally well served if the
retraction is something less than 'promptly' made. . . .",
thereby suggesting that § 210.25 is even more liberal than
the Ezaugi rule. N.Y., PENAL LAW § 210.25, Practice
Commentary 489-90 (McKinney 1975).
The use of the word "retraction" in the New York
statute provides the only justification for citing Norris.
Thus, the Ezaugi court called the defense a "recantation,"
because under its rule the crime of perjury would be
forgiven if the witness's correction complied with the
court's specifications, while Norris, on the other hand,
completely rejects all notions of absolution, and any defense
under that rule could more aptly be termed a "retraction"
defense than a "recantation."
See 2 G. MoTTLn, NEW YORK EvIDENCE WITH PROOF
OF CASES § 897 at 81 (2d ed. 1966) for description of the
retraction defense to perjury under New York law.
"In 1967, three years before 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970)
was enacted, the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment reported:
Many prosecutors believe that the incidence of
perjury is higher in organized crime cases than in
routine criminal matters. Immunity can be an effective
prosecutive weapon only if the immunized witness
then testifies truthfully. The present special proof
requirements in perjured cases inhibit prosecutors
from seeking perjury indictments and lead to much
lower conviction rates for perjury than other crimes.
Lessening of rigid proof requirements in perjury
prosecutions would strengthen the deterrent value of
perjury laws and present a greater incentive for
truthful testimony.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
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The House, however, alluded to the leading case for
the recantation rule as its authority,"m since it wanted
to encourage correction of false testimony which had
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967). The Commission
recommended that Congress abolish the two-witness and
direct evidence rules in perjury prosecutions. Id. at 141.
The Senate Judiciary Committee makes a striking case
for the need for controlling perjury:
Today, however, the possibility of perjury prosecu-
tion is not likely, and if it materializes the likelihood
of a conviction is not high. Using the available Federal
figures (1956-65 Att'y Gen. Ann. Reps.), we see that
only 52.7 percent of the defendants in perjury cases
were found guilty in the 10 year period from 1956
through 1965. In all other criminal cases, however,
78.7 percent of the defendants were found guilty. The
difference is striking. Indeed, out of 307,227 defend-
ants only 713 were even charged with perjury during
this period. The threat of a perjury conviction today
thus offers little hope as a guarantee of truthfulness in
S. REP. 57-58. Additionally, discussion in the Senate
Subcommittee Hearings centered on the primary aim of
making perjury conviction easier, and section 1623(d) was
never referred to as an encouragement to tell the truth.
Hearings centered on the primary aim of making perjury
conviction easier, and section 1623(d) was never referred to
as an encouragement to tell the truth.
On the other hand, permissive language which broadens
the applicability of section 1623 (see note 74 supra and
accompanying text) was accepted without comment. Thus,
while the Senate Judiciary Committee was most concerned
with loosening the evidentiary standards required for
perjury conviction, there is no indication that it intended an
open conflict with the House Committee's "inducement"
view of the recantation proposal. See Hearings on S. 30
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
78See note 76 supra. While the House Judiciary Com-
mittee did not expressly cite any case authority for 18
U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1970), the Committee did say: "This
recantation or retraction provision is modeled upon a New
York penal statute. (N.Y. Penal Law § 210.25)." H.R.
REP. 47-48. The Practice Commentary to this Penal Law
states that the section is based on the holding in Ezaugi.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 at 489 (McKinney 1975).
Therefore, the inference was raised that the House
Committee accepted the cite to Ezaugi. Additionally, the
Committee stated that section 1623(d)
[s]erves as an inducement to the witness to give
truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to
correct a false statement without incurring the risk
[sic] prosecution by doing so.
H. REP. 40. The Ezaugi court's policy of encouraging
truthful testimony is clearly consistent with this purpose.
Finally, in redrafting the New York penal law into
section 1623(d), the Penal Law's requirement that a
witness "retract" his false statements was altered to require
that he "admit" them. This change is consistent with the
"recantation" principle set out in Ezaugi and which the
Practice Commentary to § 210.25 explicity endorses.
Thus. in the absence of clear indication to the contrary,
already been made. 9 By accident, legislative com-
promise has produced an anti-perjury statute which
is potentially more powerful and also more flexible
than any previous statute or judicial rule. The
stepped-up penalties and reduced proof requirement
express the Senate concern that deterrence should
be emphasized in fighting perjury. The recantation
provision is the inducement which the House
Committee had intended to enact. Thus, the statute
combines the deterrent and inducement approaches
which had previously characterized separate trends
in judicial and congressional thinking into one rule
which, if properly administered, can have the re-
spective advantages of its predecessors but not their
weaknesses. While the recantation provision may
theoretically detract from the deterrent value of the
penalty provisions, this sacrifice is amply compen-
sated for by inducing corrections of completed per-
jury, thereby providing information completely un-
available under the previous scheme.
Section 1623 clearly holds implications for change
in the federal courts. Since the rule must be applied
consistently with the congressional truth-inducing
any citation to N.Y. Penal Law § 210.25 should be
construed to recognize Ezaugi as the supporting case
authority.
7 The House Judiciary Committee believed strongly in
an inducement approach to truth-gathering. The Com-
mittee stressed Title IV's dual objective of facilitating fed-
eral perjury prosecutions while also encouraging re-
cantation under some circumstances.
Ths [sic] title is intended to facilitate Federal per-
jury prosecutions and establishes a new false declar-
ation provision applicable in Federal grand jury
and court proceedings. It abandons the so-called
two-witness and direct evidence rule in such prosecu-
tions and authorized a conviction based on irreconcila-
bly inconsistent declarations under oath. As amended
title IV also permits recantation to be a bar to
prosecution if the declaration has not subtantially
affected the proceeding or it has not become manifest
that the declaration's falsity has been or will be
exposed.
H. R. REP. 33. The Senate Report, on the other hand,
shows concern only for making perjury convictions easier
to accomplish.
The purpose of this title, according to Senator
McClellan, is to 'abolish the outmoded two-witness
and direct evidence rules in perjury cases, and [to]
provide for the prosecution of persons making contra-
dictory statements under oath, without requiring
proof of the falsity of one of the statements.' (115
Cong. Rec. S 280). The theory behind this apparently
is that since title IV would create a new Federal crime
dealing with false statements before courts or grand
juries, the common law rules of evidence applicable to





purpose, there should be no reluctance to allow a
correction and to excuse the initial perjury in proper
circumstances. In addition, courts may have some
affirmative duty to notify the witness of his alterna-
tives: "If the recantation provision is to serve its
purpose, it would seem to follow that in some
circumstances there may be a requirement that the
witness know of its existence." so However, this does
not mean that reversible error will have been
committed if a prosecutor fails to inform the witness
of the section 1623(d) recantation opportunity. "' To
impose a duty on the prosecutor to warn every
witness of the recantation opportunity "in effect
shields the witness from a perjury prosecution until,
if ever, such a warning is given." 82 If the custom
became to give warnings sparingly, witnesses could
reasonably rely on receiving notice that their perjury
was suspected in time to recant. Since the witness's
original oath serves as a general warning against
perjury, giving every witness a second notice, in case
he had ignored the first, would saddle judicial
administration with an unnecessary burden.
Between the extremes, however, it is both adminis-
tratively feasible and consistent with the congres-
sional truth-inducing purpose for the prosecutor or
the judge to alert witnesses of the recantation
possibility, perhaps in conjunction with a recitation
of the perjury sanctions, whenever he feels it would
be advantageous to do so.. 8' Thus, whenever the pre-
siding officer of a federal grand jury or court ques-
" United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317, 321 (3d Cir.),
rev'd on rehearing, 506 F.2d 319 (1974). The court
correctly noted, however, that grand jury witnesses are not
generally entitled to the protective warnings which must be
given to criminal' defendants, let alone the special warning
the court proposed: "[U]nder the existent law a grand jury
witness, which is all that appellant was, is not entitled to a
warning of right to counsel and to remain silent." United
States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959, 960 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967). The government's failure to
give Miranda-type warnings [Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)] to a grand jury witness, even one as to
whom the proceedings have become accusatory or one
whom the government anticipated would perjure himself if
called to testify, does not bar a perjury prosecution for false
testimony before the grand jury. United States. v. DiGi-
ovanni, 397 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924
(1968).81United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1974). Accord, United States v. Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848 (2d
Cir. 1975).8 United States v. Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1975).
13The guidelines set out by section 1623(d) are a broad
delineation of the timeliness, prejudice, and motive inqui-
ries made by a court in deciding whether to allow a
recantation. While the statute marks the guideposts for this
inquiry, it leaves wide latitude to a judge in deciding the
tions in his own mind a witness's sincerity, he
should make his doubts known to the witness by
explaining on the one hand the penalties at stake
for conviction of perjury, and on the other the re-
cantation alternative which is available now but
which may be foreclosed to the witness later. 84
Analysis of the case law since adoption of section
1623 reveals that federal courts have been slow to
understand how the statute should be implemented to
achieve maximum anti-perjury effect. The explana-
tion may lie in the broad discretionary powers which
the statute vests in presiding judges who have been
accustomed to the strict completed crime rule, 85 or it
may be that the tangled legislative history of this
relatively new law has confused some judges.8"
Whatever the reason, it is clear that section 1623 has
not always been properly applied.
In United States v. Kahn, 8 7 the Second Circuit,
while professing to understand the workings of the
recantation provision, rejected a defendant's state-
ment of the section 1623(d) recantation principle in
favor of a district court's reiteration of the superseded
completed crime rule.88 Similarly, the Third Circuit
decision in United States v. Lardieri89 determined
the permissibility of recantation primarily by consid-
ering whether allowance would jeopardize the deter-
rent impact of section 1623, 90 a, holding which
relative weights to give each factor. The trial judge is in the
best position to make this determination, and reversal on
appeal would be unlikely.
On its face, the recantation provision and its attendant
discretionary provisions appear to be weighted neither for
nor against a finding that a correction is acceptable as
recantation. However, since the universal rule followed in
federal courts prior to section 1623(d) was grounded in a
deterrent principle which allowed no recantation, it is
reasonable to assume that, even under the new statute, the
recantation privilege will be allowed only sparingly. Ac-
cordingly, the statute's broadness may produce some bias in
practice, and it is arguable that the law should have been
more explicit, making clear the congressional intent that
recantation is to be encouraged.
8 Effective use of the recantation scheme requires thatjudges and counsel be permitted to confront witnesses they
suspect of perjury. However, where a criminal defendant
testifying at his own trial is suspected of perjury, a warning
of this type could be highly prejudicial. For this reason the
jury should be excused while the warning is being given.
"See note 83 supra.
"
5See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
8'472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982
(1973).
'11d. at 284. In a case decided after Kahn, however, the
Second Circuit appeared to properly analyze the induce-
ment component of section 1623. See United States v.
Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1975).
9506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974).
9°Id. at 322 & n.5.
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appears to upset the anti-perjury balance of section
1623 by understressing the inducement component. 9'
In United States v. Crandall, "the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania categorically
held that a recantation was impermissible because it
was made a substantial period of time after the
original false testimony. 93 However, a more proper
view was taken by the District Court for the District
of Columbia in United States v. Krough, 94 where
literal lateness was not stressed. Rather, the court
held that recantation was impermissible because the
grand jury before which the false testimony had been
given had already acted and it had become manifest
that the falsehood would be exposed. '
CONCLUSION
The completed crime rule, with its attendant
emphasis on the deterrence of initial falsehood, is of
questionable utility because of the potential threat it
poses to a defendant's presumption of innocence and
because it forecloses the potential for corrections
"Compare Lardieri with United States v. Cuevas, 510
F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1975), and United States v. Cook, 497
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'don rehearing, 489 F.2d 286
(9th Cir. 1973).
92363 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
93Id. at 654-55.
9'366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1973).
"Id. at 1256.
which may further the law's primary purpose of
truth-gathering. Recantation provisions seek the
different goal of inducing correction of prior false
testimony. By measuring the timeliness of a correc-
tion through a weighing of prejudice to the proceed-
ing and an inquiry into the motivation of the witness,
the deciding court is able to further the primary
purpose of truth-gathering while taking only a
minimal risk that a dishonest witness will escape
prosecution for perjury.
This basic formula for operation of a recantation
provision has been incorporated into the federal law
under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The statute has preserved
the deterrent value of perjury sanctions through
increased penalties while giving courts greater flexi-
bility in deciding whether to invoke them. If a
witness perjures himself in spite of the sanctions, the
penalties may still be "turned off" at the court's
discretion so that immunity from prosecution may be
bartered for information which the authorities do not
have.
The misunderstanding and misapplication of the
federal recantation statute since its inception in 1970
should not be taken as an indication of the statute's
unworkability. Federal courts must begin to apply
this law in accordance with its complementary
provisions, and those states which still cling to the
completed crime rule should discard it in favor of
more flexible recantation statutes.
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